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STATE PUNISHMENT AND MEANING IN LIFE 
Youngjae Lee 
Despite popular beliefs about what philosophers do for a living, it is 
not common for philosophers to opine on the meaning of life. It is even 
less common to see discussions of the meaning of life in works addressing 
the philosophy of punishment. Leo Zaibert’s Rethinking Punishment is 
unique for this reason.1 The book displays an unabashed enthusiasm for 
the question about the meaning in life and shows us why the question 
matters for criminal law theory. 
A central focus of Rethinking Punishment is, as Zaibert puts it, “the 
problem of meaningful existence.”2 One may ask, what does “the problem 
of meaningful existence” have to do with criminal law and the institution 
of punishment? Before answering that question, we should be clear that 
the question posed here about the relationship between state punishment 
and meaning in life is my question, not Zaibert’s. Zaibert is explicit at the 
beginning of the book that his primary interest lies in what he calls the 
“theoretical” question of punishment, as opposed to the “practical” 
question of punishment.3 And by “practical” questions, Zaibert is 
referring to the various contemporary issues arising from the state’s use 
of its power to criminalize and punish, such as overcriminalization and 
overpunishment.4 It is not that Zaibert is not interested in the problem 
of state punishment. And he expresses his hope that “the examination of 
the theoretical problems surrounding punishment may in fact help us 
better understand—and eventually even help us solve—some of those 
practical problems that have hitherto monopolized attention.”5 
Nonetheless, such “practical” problems are secondary for Zaibert, as his 
primary interest lies in the “theoretical” problem.6 
 
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. 
1. See LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2017). 
2. Id. at 9. 
3. Id. at 1–2. 
4. Id.; see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2008). 
5. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
6. Id. at 2.  
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How does, then, Zaibert consider the theoretical problem of 
punishment by focusing on the “the problem of meaningful existence”?7 
A key thought experiment for Zaibert comes from W.D. Ross’s The Right 
and the Good: 
If we compare two imaginary states of the universe, alike in the 
total amounts of virtue and vice and of pleasure and pain present 
in the two, but in one of which the virtuous were all happy and 
the vicious miserable, while in the other the virtuous were 
miserable and the vicious happy, very few people would hesitate 
to say that the first was a much better state of the universe than 
the second.8 
The puzzle in this hypothetical is that the two worlds are identical in 
terms of the amount of misery and happiness, but one appears to be a 
better world than the other because of the ways in which misery and 
happiness are distributed. The question is what exactly makes the 
difference. According to Zaibert, the reason one world is better than the 
other is desert. “[D]esert,” Zaibert argues, “gives a certain order—a 
certain meaning—to the whole in which it appears.”9 How does desert do 
that? Zaibert explains that desert “convey[s] meaning to a given situation 
and to our lives in general”10 by “providing plots to the world and to our 
lives.”11 
All of this remains somewhat abstract, and here is a concrete 
example that may help illustrate Zaibert’s view that desert gives 
meaning to our lives. Amber Rose Carlson, who was raped repeatedly as 
a teenager, has written about her feelings about the perpetrator.12 In the 
piece, she recounts a question that her therapist once raised: “Imagine 
your rapist had been found guilty and sentenced in court. What would 
you want his sentence to be?”13 Carlson’s answer to the question was that 
“[a]nything less than a death or natural life sentence [would be] 
inadequate.”14 When her therapist then asks her, “What if . . . your rapist 
 
7. See id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).  
8. Id. at 38–39 (quoting W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 138 (1930)). 
9. Id. at 43. 
10. Id. at 45. 
11. Id. at 44. 
12. Amber Rose Carlson, Is There a “Rational” Punishment for My Rapist?, N.Y. 
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had been sentenced to death, but then had been pardoned?”15 Carlson’s 
answer is as follows:  
I did not have to mull this question over. I knew I would feel 
exactly as I do now, exactly as I have felt for the past two decades: 
that the world is a terribly unjust place. It is a place where my 
life can be irrevocably transformed because a man could exert 
control, manipulation and violence over me for years without 
repercussion. It is a place where my rapist and others like him 
are enabled at both societal and local levels. . . . 
A hypothetical pardon would allow him to escape repercussions 
just as he has escaped them in reality. Nearly 20 years later as I 
began trauma therapy again, he has a secure job, an 
accomplished and beautiful wife, and a healthy daughter. He is 
living a life many dream of, while my life is disrupted as I 
continue to heal from the wounds he inflicted when I was a 
child.16 
Carlson’s response is striking for our purposes. Instead of saying that 
she would be angry or disappointed or upset, she says that she would feel 
that “the world is a terribly unjust place.”17  When Zaibert says that 
desert “conveys meaning” to our lives, it seems that this is the sort of 
emotional and cognitive state that he is referring to.18 
Here is another illustration, from a movie called While We’re Young.19 
The movie is about a friendship between two documentary filmmakers, 
Josh, who is in his forties, and Jamie, who is in his twenties. Josh is an 
idealist (“such a purist” as one character describes him), who once made 
a film called Power Elite.20 Josh is devoted to documentary filmmaking 
as a form and takes extremely seriously his obligation as a documentary 
filmmaker to tell the unvarnished, authentic truth about his subject 
matter. Josh has been working for nearly ten years on a project on “the 
distinctly American relationship between biography and history, theory 
and method and how that relates to power and class in our country, 
particularly the political, military and economic elite.”21 Josh has trouble 





18. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 43. 
19. WHILE WE’RE YOUNG (IAC Films 2014). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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story he is trying to tell, the high bar he has apparently set for himself 
and no doubt other personal hang-ups, but also because he does not 
always have the funding to finance the project. At one point in the movie, 
he tries to get a wealthy money manager (introduced in the movie simply 
as a “hedge fund” person) to invest in his movie but the attempt does not 
go anywhere because Josh’s description of the project, apparently, bores 
the hedge fund manager.22 
Jamie is also a documentary filmmaker, though, unlike Josh, who is 
mid-career, Jamie is just getting started. Jamie seeks out Josh, and Josh 
begins to mentor Jamie. As their friendship and mentoring relationship 
develop, Jamie shares with Josh an idea he has for a documentary 
project, where Jamie would open a Facebook account and make a 
documentary about meeting and talking to whichever old acquaintance 
from his past contacts him first. Josh is initially skeptical about the idea 
but encourages it. Jamie’s project grows and eventually turns into a film. 
To Josh’s surprise, Jamie seems to have lucked into a fascinating story 
of Kent, a military veteran whom Jamie had apparently known in high 
school. The documentary is a big hit. As Jamie shows the work in 
progress to his friends and acquaintances, he attracts an investor—the 
same hedge fund manager whom Josh unsuccessfully tried to court—and 
a charismatic mentor, Leslie, a legendary documentary filmmaker who 
is revered in the field and also happens to be Josh’s father-in-law.23 
But here’s the thing about Jamie’s movie: it is fraudulent. The 
Facebook setup was fake. Kent did not go to high school with Jamie. Kent 
is an old friend of Jamie’s wife. Jamie, who had learned about Kent 
through his wife, had already known that Kent would be a good subject 
for a documentary but decided to frame it as a chance encounter to make 
it more dramatic and interesting. When Josh learns about all this, he is 
furious and offended and decides to expose Jamie as a fraud, a fake 
documentarian who engages in lies that go against everything that the 
form stands for. Josh finds Jamie at an event to honor Leslie’s career in 
documentary filmmaking, where Leslie had just given a speech about 
truth, objectivity, and authenticity. This is the perfect opportunity for 
Josh to expose Jamie for the fraud he is. Josh breathlessly explains to his 
onlookers—Leslie, the hedge fund investor, and his film producer wife—
that Jamie’s documentary is full of lies, that things did not happen the 
way the documentary says they did, and that, by implication, Jamie is 
not fit to be a true documentary filmmaker. Surely everyone would now 
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To his crushing disappointment, the reaction is not what he expects. 
The hedge fund investor could not care less. His own wife does not seem 
as bothered. And, most disturbingly, Leslie, the guru in the group 
everyone worships, responds as captured in the following exchange: 
LESLIE: Is what Josh is saying true?  
JAMIE: Well . . . I did know, but I don’t think it really matters 
though, the movie’s not about that.  
JOSH: Of course it matters. Leslie, explain . . .  
LESLIE: I don’t know that it totally matters in this case.  
JOSH: What?  
. . . . 
JOSH: . . . Leslie, are you kidding me? You don’t care? You just 
gave a speech about authenticity! 
LESLIE: . . . [T]he movie works on so many levels, the 
happenstance of it, to be honest with you, is the least interesting 
part. 
JOSH: I can’t believe it! . . . . He’s a con artist. Leslie, your 
generation of sit-ins and protesters and pack rats would be 
horrified by this demon!25 
And when it finally dawns on Josh that he is “going to get no 
satisfaction” and that Jamie is “going to win no matter what,” Josh 
blankly blurts out: “This is not how the world works.”26 
Now, it is not clear at this point in the movie whether one should root 
for Josh. There are things about the character that are cringe-worthy, 
and he is certainly not flawless. His documentary may not be any good, 
either, and Leslie’s assessment at one point that it is “a six-and-a-half 
hour film that feels like it’s seven hours too long”27 may well be correct. 
But for our purposes, the important sentiment is the one that Josh 
expresses: “This is not how the world works.”28 Or, as Zaibert puts it, “a 
world in which vice was commonly rewarded and virtue commonly 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id.  
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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punished would be problematic . . . because this state of affairs would 
strike us as existentially meaningless,”29 and, on the contrary, 
“distributions according to merit suffuse the world with meaning.”30 
All of this is recognizable. The question is what it has to do with law. 
As a general matter, the state is not in the business of ensuring just 
deserts. Bad things may happen to good people, just as some people may 
achieve far more success than they deserve. But it is not the state’s job to 
intervene and take from those who have more than they deserve and give 
to those who have less than they deserve. So, we will need something 
more than just the idea of desert to give an account of state punishment. 
To answer that question, consider a couple more illustrations. The 
Untouchables,31 a film based on historical events and characters but 
mostly fictional,32 takes place during the Prohibition Era and is about 
Eliot Ness, a Bureau of Prohibition agent who leads a small team of 
agents to go after Al Capone’s bootlegging operation. Ness’ team starts to 
achieve some success against Capone’s organization, which responds by 
assassinating members of Ness’ team one by one. The man who carries 
out these killings of these agents is Frank Nitti. After Nitti kills one of 
Ness’ closest associates, James Malone, an Irish-American officer, Ness 
confronts Nitti on a rooftop and corners him. Nitti attempts to escape by 
climbing down a rope from the rooftop, and Ness, still very much upset 
from Malone’s death, realizes that he could shoot him right there and kill 
him as Nitti hangs from the side of the building. After hesitating for a 
bit, Ness uncocks his gun and puts it away. Nitti, seeing that Ness would 
not kill him, climbs back up to the rooftop and starts taunting, which 
begins the following exchange: 
NITTI:  Come on! Arrest me! What are you waiting for? Don’t just 
stand there. Arrest me! 
NESS: Don’t push me. They’re going to burn you, buddy. 
NITTI: Yeah? 
NESS: Yeah, I’m going to come see you burn, you son of a bitch, 
because you killed my friend! 
 
29. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 9. 
30. Id. at 10. 
31. THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987). 
32. MAX ALLAN COLLINS & A. BRAD SCHWARTZ, SCARFACE AND THE UNTOUCHABLE: 
AL CAPONE, ELIOT NESS, AND THE BATTLE FOR CHICAGO, at xv (2018). 
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NITTI: He died like a pig. 
NESS: What did you say? 
NITTI: I said that your friend died screaming like a stuck Irish 
pig. Now, you think about that when I beat the rap.33 
Ness, at that point, seems to snap. As Nitti starts to walk away with 
his back turned to Ness, Ness approaches him, puts his hands on Nitti’s 
shoulder, pushes him towards the edge of the rooftop and off the building. 
Nitti falls screaming to his death, landing on a car.34 
Here, Ness goes through two psychological transformations. First, 
when he first has an opportunity to kill Nitti, he goes from a private 
individual who is facing a person who has killed his closest colleague to 
a public official who will arrest Nitti and send him through the legal 
process. When Nitti then mocks Malone’s death and his Irish heritage, 
Ness is angered and immediately goes through another transformation, 
from a public official back to a private individual who avenges his friend’s 
death through an act of shocking violence. 
Contrast this scene against a scene in the movie Minority Report.35 
John Anderton is a cop who has lost his son Sean, presumably to a 
kidnapper, six years ago. One day, Anderton, while following an 
investigatory lead, stumbles into the empty apartment apparently 
belonging to a man who has pictures of several children, including that 
of Sean, strewn throughout the apartment. Once he sees the picture, 
Anderton is convinced that the person living in that apartment, whose 
name is Crow, is a criminal who kidnaps children and is responsible for 
his own son’s disappearance. Anderton then says to himself: 
Every day for the last six years I’ve thought about only two 
things. The first was what my son would look like if he were alive 
today. If I would even recognize him if I saw him on the street. 
The second was what I would do to the man who took him . . . . I 
am going to kill this man.36 
Crow comes into the apartment at that point, and Anderton grabs 
him and starts beating him up and trying to extract information about 
Sean’s whereabouts. Crow tells Anderton that he killed Sean, and 
 
33. THE UNTOUCHABLES, supra note 31. 
34. Id  
35. MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox, DreamWorks, & Amblin Entertainment 
2002). 
36. Id. 
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Anderton, overcome with grief and anger, resumes his beating of Crow 
and pulls out his gun and points it at Crow. Anderton appears to be about 
to kill Crow, but with remarkable self-restraint, he refrains from pulling 
the trigger and starts reciting the Miranda rights to Crow instead, 
thereby initiating the process of arresting Crow.37 
Ness and Anderton both are public officials who consider engaging in 
acts of personal vengeance. One of them gives in to the temptation; the 
other one does not. Both of them appear to feel the pull of a powerful 
justificatory reason to kill, but that does not mean things happen the way 
they are supposed to happen between Ness and Nitti, whereas it appears 
that Anderton behaves appropriately towards Crow, at least up to this 
point. One of the reasons Ness himself hesitates at first is because the 
right thing to do in that situation is for him to arrest him and prosecute 
him properly through the legal system, and Anderton successfully 
suppresses the desire for vengeance and lets the legal process take over. 
All of this is happening and is comprehensible to us because these 
two characters are working in the context of a particular institutional 
setup that we may call the criminal justice system. The scenes resonate 
with us because they touch on a fundamental tension present in the 
system. As the exclusive agent of punishment, and because citizens are 
generally prohibited from retaliating against wrongdoers, the state has 
an obligation to respond adequately to wrongdoing by condemning it as 
such. The state cannot preserve its legitimacy as the sole rightful holder 
of the power to punish unless it proves itself to be an adequate substitute 
for what it displaces. It seems to follow that for the state to justify its 
possession and exercise of its enormous power to criminalize and punish, 
the state should give the people results that approximate what the people 
on their own would have produced. Otherwise, individuals would be 
tempted to respond to acts of wrongdoing on their own, the way Ness did 
and the way Anderton almost did. 
However, given the enormous amount of harm that the state can 
bring about in people’s lives through its coercive and judgmental uses of 
its power to criminalize and punish, the observation that the state is 
merely giving people what they want or satisfying the people’s thirst for 
revenge by itself cannot serve as a justification for the institutional setup. 
What we need is an additional step of justifying the people’s demand for 
punishment in the first place. Without such a justificatory step, the 
government’s use of power becomes merely a version of keeping the 
people satisfied, no matter how immoral their demands may be. 
 
37. Id. 
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What would such a justificatory step look like? It seems to me that it 
could look a lot like Zaibert’s argument about desert and meaning in life. 
The state can keep its power to punish people and maintain its authority 
by keeping the people’s demand for punishment reasonably satisfied. 
And when it does so, the state is not just giving into pressure of an 
irrational mob to satisfy their thirst for vengeance. When the state seeks 
to provide adequate responses to acts of wrongdoing, it rather is giving 
wrongdoers what they deserve. And why is it good to give the wrongdoers 
what they deserve? Zaibert’s answer, as we saw above, is that “desert 
gives a certain order—a certain meaning—to the whole in which it 
appears.”38 
So, if it turns out to be the case that Ness’ treatment of Nitti is 
morally unjustified aside from its vigilante justice aspect, then the legal 
system that condemns and stigmatizes Nitti may be unjustified, too. 
Similarly, if Anderton is not morally justified to kill Crow himself, then 
to the extent whatever awaits Crow when he is brought to the legal 
system resembles Anderton’s treatment of Crow, then the legal system 
cannot be justified, either. Such a close relationship between state 
punishment and private retaliation is affirmed by Zaibert when he says 
that even though there are “excellent, typically overriding reasons to 
prevent vigilantism, . . . this is not because what a vigilante does is 
completely valueless—particularly if it is very similar to what an 
authority would have done.”39  In a previous book, Zaibert has similarly 
argued that “a perfectly virtuous vigilante . . . is surely conceivable,”40 
and that “it is extremely difficult to distinguish sharply between 
punishment and revenge”41 under his account, which he has touted as a 
point in favor of his account.42 
Therefore, even though Zaibert announces at the beginning of his 
book that he is mainly interested in theoretical problems of punishment 
generally and not in the problem of state punishment, it turns out that 
his argument provides an important component of a case for state 
punishment. Without an argument like Zaibert’s, we can end up with a 
theoretical justification for the institution of punishment that is hollow 
at its core. State punishment may be justified as a way to replace the 
system of private vengeance, but if whatever state punishment is 
replacing is morally unjustified, then to the extent that the state 
produces outcomes that resemble those that would be arrived at under 
 
38. See ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 43. 
39. Id. at 48–49. 
40. LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 185 (2016). 
41. Id. at 69. 
42. Id. at 95. 
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the system of private vengeance, then state punishment cannot be 
morally justified, either. All of Zaibert’s talk about meaning in life, then, 
is important because those who seek to justify the institution of 
punishment may need an account like Zaibert’s to offer a complete 
defense of the system, and this is the way in which Zaibert’s book 
demonstrates why the question of meaning may matter for criminal law 
theorists. It seems to me that this is an important theoretical 
contribution of Zaibert’s book. 
However, I would like to end this comment with a cautionary note. If 
it is indeed the case that state punishment exists as a way of displacing 
the system of private vengeance, we should think about the ways in 
which the legal system is supposed to be an improvement over the system 
it replaces. The standard story is that the legal system is superior 
because of its ability to investigate the factual basis for claims of 
wrongdoing thoroughly and accurately; its provision of basic procedural 
safeguards for the accused, such as those found in the Bill of Rights; and 
proportionality limitations on amounts of punishment. I would like to 
focus on the aspect that is of central importance to Zaibert’s theory: 
suffering.  
Zaibert emphasizes the significance of suffering throughout the book. 
He says, for instance, that there is an “essential conceptual connection 
between punishment and suffering.”43 He elaborates that “[w]hatever 
specific punishments turn out to be, to the extent that they remain forms 
of punishment, they will necessarily have to (seek to) make the 
wrongdoer suffer.”44 He also says that “[t]o punish . . . is to (try to) inflict 
suffering  . . . on someone as a response to her wrongdoing”45 and that 
“punishment is incoherent without it being an attempt to inflict 
suffering.”46 
Is Zaibert right about this? Since the question here is what the 
recipient of punishment deserves, perhaps we can start with an analysis 
of the general concept of desert. As Joel Feinberg explained in his seminal 
discussion, every desert statement has at least three elements.47 In the 
statement, “S deserves X in virtue of F,” S is the deserving person, X is 
what he deserves, and F is the desert basis—that is, the basis for X.48 
To understand how it is that a person deserves something, we must 
understand two relationships: the relationship between the person who 
 
43. ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 3. 
44. Id. at 7. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 11. 
47. Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN 
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970). 
48. Id. 
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is deserving and the desert basis (S and F), and that between what is 
deserved and the desert basis (X and F). The person who is deserving and 
the desert basis (S and F) are related in that the desert basis has to be 
an attribute of the deserving person. In the relationship between what is 
deserved and the basis for desert (X and F), the key concept is “fitness” 
or appropriateness.49 So, a response to criminal wrongdoing is “fitting” or 
“appropriate” only if it takes a form that symbolizes or expresses the 
society’s condemnatory attitude towards the criminal conduct. This is 
why it would be inappropriate to reward criminals, whereas infliction of 
suffering is often seen as an appropriate response. Second, a corollary to 
this is that not every form of loss is an acceptable form of punishment in 
every society, depending on the symbolic significance the particular form 
of loss has in the society.50 For instance, the sanction of “community 
service” may appear inappropriate for certain crimes given the mixed 
signals—either as a sanction or as evidence of the participant’s 
generosity and public spiritedness—such service gives.51  
The concept of proportionality in punishment follows from the idea of 
fitness.52 In short, the harshness of the punishment should reflect our 
level of condemnation or disapproval of the criminal act. A punishment 
would be excessive, then, if the degree of condemnation symbolized by 
the amount of punishment were too high relative to the criminal’s 
blameworthiness. A punishment also would be excessive in situations 
where it is imposed on a person who has not committed any acts for which 
the kind of condemnatory expression that accompanies criminal sanction 
would be appropriate. A corollary to all of this is that the harshness of 
the punishment should increase as the appropriate level of condemnation 
or disapproval increases, which in turn should increase as the gravity of 
the crime increases.53 
Fitness in desert has both comparative and noncomparative 
aspects.54 To illustrate, in the punishment context, the noncomparative 
aspect stands for the view that a person convicted of a given crime should 
receive a certain amount of punishment, no matter how other people are 
treated, while the comparative aspect focuses on what the punishment 
for a given crime is compared to punishments for different crimes of 
varying degrees of blameworthiness. For example, if a criminal has been 
sentenced to five years in prison for stealing a car, noncomparative desert 
 
49. Id. at 77–78. 
50. Id. at 114. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 78. 
53. Id. at 118. 
54. Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974). 
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asks whether his deed is serious enough to warrant such a response by 
the state, regardless of how the state is treating other car thieves and 
criminals of more and less serious crimes. Comparative desert, by 
contrast, is about whether the car thief is being treated the same way as 
other car thieves and other comparably serious criminals and how his 
punishment compares to punishments imposed on those who have 
committed more or less serious crimes. 
Why do both aspects—comparative and noncomparative—matter? 
Noncomparative desert matters in the following way: when we say that 
it would be clearly disproportionate to punish parking violation with one 
year in prison, that statement would be true even if every parking 
violation were treated the same way and more serious crimes were 
treated more harshly. In other words, even if a sentencing scheme 
generates a series of sentences that are in perfect comparative desert 
relationship to one another, it is possible for some or all of those sentences 
to be too harsh. 
The comparative aspect matters, too, as what one deserves is 
sometimes determined in reference to what others deserve. So when the 
state punishes, it condemns the behavior it punishes as wrong, and the 
degree to which the behavior is condemned is expressed by varying the 
amount of punishment. Therefore, how one’s punishment stands in 
relation to punishments for other crimes supplies a crucial piece of 
information as to how wrong the behavior punished is viewed by the 
society. This means that a punishment imposed on a criminal would be 
“undeserved” if it is more severe than the punishment imposed on those 
who have committed more serious crimes or crimes of the same 
seriousness, because the judgment it expresses about the seriousness of 
the criminal’s behavior would be inappropriate. For instance, as the 
death penalty carries a social meaning as the ultimate punishment for 
the most serious crimes, each time the state imposes a death sentence it 
shows that it considers the crime at issue to be not only one of the most 
serious offenses committed against the society, but also an offense that 
is as serious as other crimes that the society considers to be the most 
serious. Those who commit offenses less serious than the most serious 
offenses and are still sentenced to death would be receiving harsher 
sentences than they deserve, because part of what it means for them to 
receive the punishment they deserve is that they are punished less 
harshly than the worst criminal. 
In this way, comparative desert functions the way an audience at a 
play responds to various performers at the end of the performance.55 
 
55. I borrow this example from David Miller. See David Miller, Comparative and 
Noncomparative Desert, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 25, 30 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003). 
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Assuming that a given production is good enough to merit applause, the 
audience members vary the length and intensity of their applause to 
show their relative levels of appreciation for different members of the 
cast. There may be noncomparative desert at work here, because if the 
production as a whole is not worthy of applause, no member of the cast 
may deserve any showing of appreciation. But barring such a situation, 
what determines how the audience greets each member of the cast is the 
principle of comparative desert. That is, other things being equal, 
generally the cast members with bigger and more difficult parts tend to 
receive the longer, louder, and more intense applause. The reason this 
has to be so is that there is a limit as to how long, loud, and intense 
cheering can get, and the audience has to save their longest applause for 
the cast member they appreciate the most. If they are too quick to 
unleash their most enthusiastic showing of appreciation and use it on 
minor characters, they may not be able to express to the ones with the 
leading parts how much more they appreciate them than those with 
lesser roles. And if such a situation unfortunately arises, those who 
deserve more recognition from the audience would not be receiving what 
they deserve, not just what they comparatively deserve. It is in this sense 
that what one deserves cannot be determined without considering both 
comparative and noncomparative aspects.  
Incidentally, it is important to note here that nothing in this account 
requires suffering as a response to criminal wrongdoing. According to the 
account presented, the important feature of desert is that of a “fitting” or 
“appropriate” response. It is true that what is typically considered to be 
a “fitting” response to criminal wrongdoing is infliction of suffering, but, 
it seems to me, that is not a requirement of this theory of desert. The 
right level of condemnation need not be expressed in terms of inflictions 
of suffering, as, say, a symbolic response can suffice.  
Zaibert would disagree with the position that punishment and 
suffering can be decoupled in the way I am suggesting. Perhaps Zaibert 
is correct, and let’s grant that he is correct and I am wrong on the issue 
of the conceptual connection between punishment and suffering. It still 
seems to me that there are good reasons to attempt to reduce the amount 
of suffering in our criminal justice system, and to the extent that the state 
can find a way to devise a fitting and appropriate response to criminal 
wrongdoing without inflicting suffering, that is a goal worthy of our 
attention. I worry that Zaibert’s insistence on a “conceptual connection” 
between punishment and suffering would have the effect of preventing 
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such efforts from taking off, and would be received as an invitation to 
complacency and indifference to human suffering inflicted in our name.56   
Now, to be fair, Zaibert is concerned with reducing suffering as well, 
as he notes that there is “obvious value in diminishing suffering in the 
world” and there is value in forgiveness, which he defines as “sparing 
(deserved) suffering.”57 Much of this book is devoted to showing that there 
is a “tension between the value of punishment and the value of 
forgiveness,” and that in “[m]ost cases, particularly those occurring 
within the context of modern criminal justice systems . . . we simply 
cannot punish with clean hands.”58 Fully recognizing this point, Zaibert 
suggests, would make us “approach the prospect of punishing wrongdoers 
(or of setting up primitive institutions) with more sober circumspection 
than we have tended to do.”59 
Zaibert and I are in agreement, then, that punishment ought to 
trouble us because of its real human costs. However, I worry that his talk 
of a “conceptual connection between punishment and suffering” would 
still tend to make us inured to the existence of suffering in our criminal 
justice system while his talk about the value of forgiveness gets ignored.60 
My sympathies are rather with approaches that deemphasize suffering 
in accounts of punishment. Zaibert points out, in response to the view 
that communication—or expression-focused—theories of punishment are 
more humane than a view like his, that “[c]ommunication can cause 
suffering, and sometimes brutally and nastily so.”61 That is fair enough 
as a way to contribute to a theoretical dispute. However, how we interpret 
what we do can push us in different directions in the way we build and 
design and operate our institutions, and positing that to punish a person 
is to aim make him or her suffer could push us in one direction whereas 
positing that one can punish without aiming to make a person suffer 
could push us in a different direction. 
 
 
56. See ZAIBERT, supra note 1, at 3, 7. 
57. Id. at 3. 
58. Id. at 242. 
59. Id. 
60. See id. at 3. 
61. Id. at 122. 
